TSHISEKEDI'S GOVERNMENT AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF ANTI-RWANDA MOBILIZATION
Two years later, following Since his his 2019 inauguration as president of the DRC in 2019, and with marked escalation after his 2023 re-election; President Félix Tshisekedi has systematically built a political architecture of anti-Rwanda mobilization resting on three mutually reinforcing pillars: incendiary presidential rhetoric threatening Rwanda's sovereignty; deliberate hosting of Rwandan dissident figures (particularly the Habyarimana family) to delegitimize Kigali internationally; and the cultivation of anti-Rwanda voices in the Congolese diaspora. Together, these actions create the enabling environment in which the FDLR; a UN-sanctioned militia founded by perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, continues to operate embedded within the Congolese armed forces (FARDC).
1. Presidential Rhetoric: Threats and Escalation
At his December 2023 campaign rally in Kinshasa, Tshisekedi issued an explicit public threat:
"If you re-elect me and Rwanda persists… I will request parliament to authorise a declaration of war. We will march on Kigali."
(Al Jazeera)
In Goma, during this election rally, he declared:
“President Kagame will no longer sleep at home; he will seek refuge in the forest. From Goma, we do not need to go to Kigali—we have drones.”
This was not an isolated statement. In a March 2024 radio interview, he reiterated that any further Rwandan action would trigger a formal war declaration via both chambers of Congress.
Tshisekedi also compared President Kagame to "Adolf Hitler" with "expansionist aims," and made explicit threats to bomb the Rwandan capital. Rwanda's Foreign Ministry formally cited these threats in a January 2026 communiqué, noting that Congolese leadership had “repeatedly declared their intention to invade Rwanda and change its government by force” and that Rwanda “takes them at their word.”
Rwanda's defensive measures, including full air-defense deployment and the degradation of DRC's Chinese-supplied CH-4 attack drones, were directly attributed to these threats.
International Crisis Group analyst Richard Moncrieff warned that the rhetoric had “gone too far” for regional diplomacy.
Following re-election, Tshisekedi did not moderate; branding Rwandan forces as engaging in “terrorist acts” during his January 2025 national address as M23 advanced on Goma.
2. The Habyarimana Network: Platforming Genocide-Linked Dissidents
Central to Tshisekedi's anti-Rwanda coalition is Jean-Luc Habyarimana; eldest son of former President Juvénal Habyarimana, under whose government the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi was planned and executed.
Investigations reported and confirmed by Rwandan presidential statements document a secret June 2024 visit by Jean-Luc to Kinshasa, meeting senior DRC security officials with the stated aim of strengthening the FDLR.
Reports indicate he was designated as the FDLR's overall political commander in a planned “powerful military coalition.”
President Kagame was unambiguous in an April 2026 Jeune Afrique interview:
“Tshisekedi or Congo has been trying to use [Habyarimana's son] to mobilise support for FDLR… All of those constitute a network that is in the leadership or in association with FDLR.”
Kinshasa has also been documented funding Xtrafrica, a digital platform run by Jean-Luc Habyarimana, used to sanitize the Habyarimana family's genocidal legacy, attack Kigali, and amplify pro-Tshisekedi content internationally with content distributed through DRC state broadcaster RTNC.
3. The Diaspora Alliance: State-Endorsed Hate Speech
In December 2025, Tshisekedi received at the presidential palace two Congolese-American expatriates; Jean-Claude Mubenga and Kalonji Kabamba wa Mulumba, in a meeting framed around “national unity.”
The day after, Mubenga posted content using dehumanizing language and praising armed groups targeting Kinyarwanda-speaking civilians.
His prior public statements had called for the elimination of Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese with machetes, likened Tutsi to “cockroaches,” and urged young Congolese to “annihilate” Tutsi.
Tshisekedi received him as a “true patriot”.
Similarly, National Assembly member Justin Batakwira; who referred to Tutsi as "snakes born of the devil", received a presidential audience rather than censure.
Tshisekedi's government also deployed its official communications infrastructure to coordinate social media campaigns (CongolaisTelema, ToutPourLaPatrie, BendeleEkweyaTe) that systematically vilified Rwanda, creating the political context in which diaspora anti-Rwanda actors operate.
The US Embassy in Kinshasa formally raised concern about the “worrying escalation of xenophobia and hate speech inciting violence against the Rwandophone community.”
4. The FDLR Protection Regime: Political Cover for a Genocidal Militia
The UN Group of Experts Final Report (S/2024/432) found that the Congolese government “continued to use Wazalendo groups and FDLR as proxies in the fight against M23,” and that FARDC “provided military equipment and financing to FDLR-FOCA in exchange for its role in fighting M23, in violation of the arms embargo.”
Formal liaison structures were identified, including FDLR commander Fidel Sebagenzi as liaison between FDLR-FOCA and the North Kivu Governor.
When international pressure produced a public FARDC communiqué in October 2025 calling for FDLR disarmament, leaked UN midterm reporting revealed that senior FARDC officers and government officials subsequently reassured the FDLR of continued cooperation.
The US Department of State condemned this systematic collaboration.
5. Conclusion
The political and military dimensions of anti-Rwanda mobilization are not parallel tracks; they are the same track.
When Tshisekedi frames Rwanda in the ideological vocabulary of the FDLR, FARDC field commanders who collaborate with the militia face no political cost.
Presidential rhetoric, dissident platforming, diaspora mobilization, and FDLR operational impunity form a single, mutually reinforcing system built from Kinshasa.
References
- Al Jazeera — 'Could DR Congo's Tshisekedi declare war on Rwanda if re-elected?' (December 2023): https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/12/21/analysis-could-tshisekedi-declare-war-on-rwanda-if-re-elected
- Rwanda Ministry of Foreign Affairs — 'Rwanda Clarifies Security Posture' (January 2026): https://www.minaffet.gov.rw/updates/news-details/rwanda-clarifies-security-posture
- KT Press — Rwanda Strongly Rejects Accusations by President Tshisekedi (October 2025): https://www.ktpress.rw/2025/10/rwanda-strongly-rejects-accusations-by-empty-drum-president-tshisekedi/
- KT Press — 'Kagame: Tshisekedi Using Habyarimana Family to Build Support for FDLR in France, Globally' (April 2026 — Jeune Afrique interview): https://www.ktpress.rw/2026/04/kagame-tshisekedi-using-habyarimana-family-to-build-support-for-fdlr-in-france-globally-full-interview/
- AllAfrica / New Times — 'Kagame: Habyarimana's Son Is Part of Kinshasa-FDLR Network' (April 2026): https://allafrica.com/stories/202604030509.html
- Great Lakes Eye — 'Habyarimana Family, Tshisekedi, Form Military Alliance Against Rwanda' (October 2025): https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Habyarimana--family,--Tshisekedi,--form--military--alliance--against--Rwanda_2000
- Great Lakes Eye — 'Hariana Veras: Tshisekedi's New Voice of Propaganda' (January 2026): https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Hariana--Veras:--Tshisekedi%E2%80%99s--new--voice--of--propaganda_2092
- Africanews — 'Controversy Grows in DRC over Alleged Tolerance of Anti-Tutsi Rhetoric' (December 2025): https://www.africanews.com/2025/12/29/controversy-grows-in-drc-over-alleged-tolerance-of-anti-tutsi-rhetoric/
- UN Group of Experts — Final Report S/2024/432 (DRC Sanctions Committee, July 2024): https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/final-report-group-experts-democratic-republic-congo-s2024432-enarruzh
- Great Lakes Eye — 'Kinshasa Reassures FDLR of Continued Cooperation Despite Washington Accord — UN Experts' (November 2025): https://thegreatlakeseye.com/post?s=Kinshasa--reassures--FDLR--of--continued--cooperation--despite--Washington--accord-----UN--experts_2039
- US Department of State — 'U.S. Support for the UN Group of Experts Report on Eastern DRC' (January 2025): https://2021-2025.state.gov/office-of-the-spokesperson/releases/2025/01/u-s-support-for-the-united-nations-group-of-experts-report-on-the-eastern-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
- US Embassy DRC — 'Statement on Report by UN Group of Experts' (August 2024): https://cd.usembassy.gov/statement-on-report-by-un-group-of-experts/
- KT Press — 'Kagame: Don't Expect Rwanda to Drop Its Defensive Measures While Tshisekedi Acts Freely' (April 2026): https://www.ktpress.rw/2026/04/kagame-dont-expect-rwanda-to-drop-its-defensive-measures-while-tshisekedi-acts-freely/
- International Crisis Group — 'Fall of DRC's Goma: Urgent Action Needed to Avert a Regional War' (January 2025): https://www.crisisgroup.org/stm/africa/great-lakes/democratic-republic-congo/fall-drcs-goma-urgent-action-needed-avert-regional-war
- Clingendael Spectator — 'Anti-Tutsi Hate Speech Refuels Conflict in Eastern DR Congo' (2022): https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/publication/anti-tutsi-hate-speech-refuels-conflict-eastern-dr-congo
- KT Press — 'DRC Army Spokesperson Draws Veil to Reveal Genocidal State' (December 2025): https://www.ktpress.rw/2025/12/drc-army-spokesperson-draws-veil-to-reveal-genocidal-state/